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Abstract: 
0	 	Our	 study	 articulates	 and	 empirically	 tests	 a	 theory	 of	 how	 the	 parent	 firm	 of	 a	 multina-
tional corporation (MNc) can achieve global integration of subsidiaries into the MNc’s in-
trafirm	network	by	using	managerial	“tools”	to	manipulate	the	MNC’s	formal	organizational	
architecture.
0	 	Taking	 a	 subsidiary’s	 performance	 as	 an	 observable	 criterion	 to	measure	 the	 success	 of	 its	
integration	into	the	global	intra-firm	network,	the	model	is	tested	on	a	unique	dataset	of	287	
international R&D subsidiaries.
0	 	Our	findings	suggest	that	the	parent	firm	can	actively	improve	a	subsidiary’s	performance	and	
hence	 its	 integration	by	 encouraging	knowledge	 asset	 transfer,	 by	granting	 the	 subsidiary	 a	
mandate	for	undertaking	activities	on	behalf	of	the	corporation	as	a	whole,	and	by	providing	
it with more operational autonomy.
0	 	These	 findings	 open	 up	 a	 deep	 perspective	 of	 how	 subsidiary	 integration	 can	 be	 achieved	
by	appropriate	managerial	“tools”	 in	 the	context	of	 international	 innovation.	We	discuss	 the	
implications of these results for the literature and for managers.
Keywords:  Subsidiary	integration	·	Organizational	architecture	·	Managerial	tools	·	
strategic autonomy · Operational autonomy · international innovation
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Introduction
A	major	reason	why	multinational	corporations	(MNCs)	exist	is	their	ability	to	globally	
leverage	dispersed	subsidiary-specific	advantages	and	to	generate	new	knowledge	through	
a	global	synthesis	of	dispersed	knowledge	(Almeida	and	Phene	2004; andersson et al. 
2002;	Buckley	and	Carter	1996; Davis and Meyer 2004;	Rugman	and	Verbeke	2001). 
these abilities constitute a major source of competitive advantage for MNcs (anders-
son et al. 2002; Ghoshal 1986; Ghoshal and Nohria 1989;	Rosenzweig	and	Singh	1991; 
Yamin	and	Sinkovics	2009,	2010).	Over	 the	past	 two	decades,	many	MNCs	have	dis-
persed	their	knowledge	development	processes	internationally	and	started	to	perform	an	
increasing	share	of	their	research	and	development	(R&D)	activities	abroad,	attempting	
to	integrate	subsidiaries	into	a	global	innovation	network	(Cantwell	1989; Dunning 1994; 
Granstrand et al. 1992;	Hakanson	1995; serapio and Dalton 1999).
“Integration	of	subsidiaries”	designates	the	continuous	leveraging	of	each	subsidiary’s	
knowledge	base	within	the	MNC	(Mudambi	2002,	p.	4).	Typically,	by	such	integration,	
MNCs	strive	to	utilize	information	and	other	knowledge	assets	developed	by	diverse	sub-
sidiaries,	to	coordinate	and	integrate	activities	across	geographically	dispersed	subsidiar-
ies,	and	to	centralize	decision-making	authority	while	maintaining	local	responsiveness	
(Yeniyurt et al. 2005;	Yamin	and	Sinkovics	2010).
While	the	beneficial	effects	of	global	integration	have	been	highlighted	in	the	litera-
ture,	little	attention	has	been	devoted	to	the	question	of	how	(i.e.,	by	which	means)	it	can	
actually	 be	 achieved	 (Björkman	 et	 al.	 2004; Foss and Pedersen 2002; Persaud 2005). 
The	study	of	categorical	subsidiary	types	and	roles	(e.g.,	Birkinshaw	and	Morrison	1995; 
Frost et al. 2002;	Nobel	and	Birkinshaw	1998) contributes little to our understanding of 
how integration can be achieved because there might be considerable variation across 
subsidiaries	that	are	assigned	to	the	same	category,	and	the	boundaries	between	categories	
may not be clear-cut (asmussen et al. 2009;	Birkinshaw	and	Hood	1997; Nobel and Bir-
kinshaw	1998).	Contributions	that	focus	on	antecedents	of	knowledge	transfers	by	sub-
sidiaries	(e.g.,	Gupta	and	Govindarajan	2000;	Hakanson	and	Nobel	2001; hansen 1999; 
Szulanski	1996; Zander and Kogut 1995)	are	limited	in	their	ability	to	analyze	whether	
or	 not	 these	 knowledge	 transfers	 ultimately	 lead	 to	 global	 integration	 of	 subsidiaries,	
since	knowledge	must	be	put	to	appropriate	use	after	transfer	to	generate	value	(Ambos	
and ambos 2009; haas and hansen 2005; Kotabe and Mudambi 2004; Yamin and Otto 
2004).
With	very	 few	knowledge-based	empirical	exemptions	 (Björkman	et	al.	2004; Foss 
and Pedersen 2002)	and	the	exploratory	study	of	Persaud	(2005),	a	persistent	knowledge	
gap	exists	regarding	how	(i.e.,	by	which	means)	integration	can	be	achieved	(Ambos	and	
ambos 2009;	Bouquet	and	Birkinshaw	2008; Foss and Pedersen 2004; luo 2002;	Wu	et	
al. 2007; Jean et al. 2010).
The	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	help	close	this	gap	by	asking:	“How, if at all, do manage-
rial “tools” enhance subsidiary performance and thus contribute to global integration?”	
By	“(managerial)	tools”,	we	understand	those	means	that	managers	use	to	create	a	prom-
ising	structural	context	for	conducting	business	(Doz	and	Prahalad	1984; Melin 1992). 
We	focus	on	“tools”	by	which	the	parent	firm	can	manipulate	the	MNC’s	formal	organi-
zational	architecture.	Thus,	the	paper	contributes	to	the	literature	in	multiple	ways.
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First,	 since	we	study	“tools”	on	 the	organizational	 level	of	analysis,	we	can	add	an	
organizational-level	 complement	 to	 the	 individual-level	 focus	 of	 prior	 studies	 that	
have focused on behavioral and social control mechanisms as antecedents of integra-
tion	(e.g.,	Björkman	et	al.	2004; Persaud 2005).	Second,	using	subsidiary	performance	
as	an	indicator	for	successful	integration,	we	simultaneously	study	antecedents	of	sub-
sidiary performance for which empirical evidence is rare (Monteiro et al. 2008).	Third,	
distinguishing between strategic and operational autonomy as antecedents of integration 
allows	us	to	address	the	frequently	highlighted	conflict	between	the	subsidiary’s	freedom	
to	create	knowledge	assets	and	 the	coordination	 that	 is	necessary	 to	globally	 integrate	
these	(e.g.,	Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998; Persaud 2005; Yamin and Otto 2004) and thus to help 
resolve	 inconsistent	findings	on	the	 influence	of	autonomy	(Ambos	and	Schlegelmilch	
2007; Young and tavares 2004).	Fourth,	we	contribute	to	resolving	the	paradox	that	many	
MNCs	seem	to	re-centralize	or	completely	localize	activities	rather	than	to	achieve	effec-
tive global integration (Benito et al. 2003; currie and Kerrin 2004;	Doz	et	al.	2006; Fors 
1997; Pearce 1990; Rugman 2005) by studying how global integration can be achieved 
by	deploying	appropriate	managerial	“tools”.	Finally,	these	contributions	also	create	ben-
eficial	advice	for	executives	(Foss	and	Pedersen	2002).
From	a	 theoretical	 framework	anchored	 in	 the	 resource-based	view	of	 the	firm	 that	
links	subsidiary	performance	to	successful	global	integration,	we	develop	hypotheses	on	
three	specific	“tools”:	inter-subsidiary	knowledge	asset	transfer,	subsidiary	mandate,	and	
subsidiary	autonomy.	We	use	a	unique	sample	of	287	R&D	subsidiaries	to	test	these,	find-
ing	strong	support	for	our	claims.	We	finally	discuss	implications	for	theory,	managerial	
practice,	and	future	research.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
The	successful	integration	of	a	subsidiary	into	the	MNC	network	is	more	likely	when	the	
parent	firm’s	 integration	attempts	are	actively	 supported	by	 the	 subsidiary	 (Luo	2005; 
Szulanski	2003).	Subsidiaries,	however,	tend	to	be	primarily	interested	in	their	own	ends	
and	only	secondarily	in	those	of	the	MNC	or	of	the	parent	firm	(Mudambi	and	Navarra	
2004; Nohria and Ghoshal 1994).	We	therefore	expect	that	subsidiaries	are	more	willing	
to	attend	to	headquarters’	interests	if	they	believe	that	headquarters’	and	their	own	inter-
ests are compatible (eisenhardt 1989,	p.	62).	Among	the	primary	goals	of	a	subsidiary	
is	 its	 interest	 to	 increase	 its	own	financial	performance	(Mudambi	and	Navarra	2004). 
Increased	performance	is	likely	to	lead	to	significant	advantages	for	the	subsidiary	and	its	
staff,	such	as	a	significant	reduction	of	the	possibility	that	the	parent	firm	will	divest	the	
subsidiary,	greater	influence	on	strategic	decisions	of	the	parent	firm,	or	increasing	bonus	
payments for subsidiary managers (andersson et al. 2001;	Björkman	et	al.	2004; hite et 
al. 1987).	A	subsidiary’s	willingness	to	contribute	to	global	integration	is	therefore	likely	
to	be	associated	with	its	expected	improvements	of	its	own	financial	performance.
The	resource-based	view	of	the	firm	(RBV)	suggests	that	superior	financial	perform-
ance	 is	 linked	 to	 superior	 resource	 endowments,	 superior	 resource	utilization,	 or	 both	
(Amit	and	Schoemaker	1993; Barney 1991;	Crook	et	al.	2008; teece et al. 1997;	Wern-
erfelt 1984).	 It	 can	provide	a	 strong	conceptual	 foundation	 to	analyze	 the	effects	of	 a	
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global integration strategy on MNc performance (Yeniyurt et al. 2005; Zou and cavusgil 
2002).	To	exploit	and	improve	an	organization’s	resource	base	are	central	motives	of	an	
integration	strategy,	since	the	resulting	superior	resource	endowments	are	likely	to	lead	
to superior performance in the future (Yeniyurt et al. 2005,	p.	3).
Substantial	 improvements	in	the	resource	endowments	or	resource	utilization	of	the	
overall	MNC	network	are	likely	to	be	associated	with	substantial	improvements	of	the	
resource	endowments	or	resource	utilization	of	the	involved	subunits.	Therefore,	the	par-
ent	firm	should	be	interested	in	improving	the	subsidiary’s	resource	base	or	utilization	of	
resources.	For	the	same	reason,	subsidiary	performance	should	be	positively	associated	
with	the	extent	to	which	a	subsidiary	is	integrated	into	the	MNC’s	global	intra-firm	net-
work	(Tsai	2001).	Therefore,	the	parent	firm	has	an	incentive	to	manipulate	its	internal	
organizational	structure	such	that	this	manipulation	is	likely	to	augment	the	subsidiary’s	
resource	base	or	 resource	utilization.	Such	manipulation	can	affect	 the	MNC’s	 formal	
structure,	its	informal	structure,	or	both.	In	this	paper,	we	focus	exclusively	on	“tools”	
that	manipulate	the	firm’s	formal	organizational	structure,	since	managers	can	make	dis-
crete	choices	 to	 shape	 their	firm’s	 formal	 structure,	whereas	 the	 informal	organization	
is	typically	rather	difficult	to	shape	directly	(Nickerson	and	Zenger	2002).	While	infor-
mal architecture merely emerges,	 formal	architecture	 is	explicitly	mandated (Gulati et 
al. 2009,	emphasis	added).	Therefore,	manipulating	formal	structure	will	likely	be	key	if	
managers	want	to	change	their	organization	(Ethiraj	and	Levinthal	2004).	We	concentrate	
on	three	specific	formal	“tools”	for	which	there	is	consensus	in	the	literature	regarding	
their	importance	and	relevance:	inter-subsidiary	knowledge	asset	transfer	(cf.	Kogut	and	
Zander 1992; luo 2002;	Szulanski	1996; townsend et al. 2004; tsai 2002),	subsidiary	
mandates	(cf.	Birkinshaw	1996;	Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998; cantwell and Mudambi 2005; 
Feinberg 2000; Roth and Morrison 1992),	and	subsidiary	autonomy	(cf.	Birkinshaw	et	
al. 2005; Gates and egelhoff 1986; Johnston and Menguc 2007;	Nobel	and	Birkinshaw	
1998; Young and tavares 2004).
The	selection	of	 these	 three	particular	“tools”	also	seems	appropriate	 to	ensure	 that	
each of the three interwoven aspects of Yeniyurt et al.’s (2005)	 integration	framework	
is	addressed:	the	encouragement	of	knowledge	asset	transfers	is	especially	related	to	the	
emergence	of	a	globally	shared	knowledge	base;	the	granting	of	a	mandate	to	the	global	
exploitation	of	 an	 individual	 unit’s	 strengths	 (which	 is	 the	motive	 behind	value-chain	
coordination); and subsidiary autonomy—especially since we distinguish between stra-
tegic and operational autonomy—to balancing central authority and responsiveness to 
local	markets.	We	now	develop	specific	hypotheses	anchored	in	the	RBV	that	link	these	
“tools”	 to	 subsidiary	 performance	 by	 analyzing	 changes	 in	 resource	 endowments	 and	
utilization.
Hypothesis	1:	Association	Between	Knowledge	Asset	Transfer	and	Subsidiary	Performance
Knowledge	assets	comprise	information,	know-how,	practices,	capabilities,	technologies,	
and products (Yang et al. 2008,	p.	887,	p.	889).	Subsidiaries	that	transfer	knowledge	assets	
to	other	subsidiaries	may	benefit	from	this	transfer	because	engaging	in	knowledge	transfer	
creates reciprocity (Gouldner 1960; Monteiro et al. 2008).	Thus,	knowledge	tends	to	flow	
to	those	units	that	frequently	share	their	knowledge	with	the	rest	of	the	organization.	This	is	
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likely	to	end	up	creating	a	subgroup	of	units	within	the	MNC	that	are	frequently	exchang-
ing	knowledge	among	themselves,	while	those	units	that	rarely	act	as	sources	of	knowledge	
transfers	are	also	unlikely	to	receive	knowledge	from	other	units	(Monteiro	et	al.	2008).
Subsidiaries	 with	 greater	 knowledge	 inflows	 generate	 a	 greater	 knowledge	 output	
(Mudambi and Navarra 2004). the recombination of particularly strong competencies 
from different units may stimulate the further development of these competencies (Kogut 
and Zander 1992,	2003).	Thus,	an	 isolated	subsidiary	 that	does	not	participate	 in	such	
exchange	relationships	is	likely	to	perform	worse	than	other	subsidiaries	(Monteiro	et	al.	
2008; tsai 2001).
Further,	the	transfer	of	knowledge	assets	to	other	subsidiaries	is	also	likely	to	increase	
the	importance	of	the	transferring	subsidiary	for	the	MNC	group,	which	should	in	turn	
increase	its	bargaining	power	and	strategic	influence	within	the	intrafirm	network	(Fors-
gren and Pedersen 2000; Forsgren et al. 2000; Mudambi and Navarra 2004). this greater 
bargaining power within the MNc gives the focal subsidiary the opportunity to directly 
appropriate	a	higher	level	of	the	rents	that	are	available	within	the	intra-MNC	network	
(Mudambi and Navarra 2004).	 Therefore,	 by	 encouraging	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	
assets	 between	 subsidiaries,	 the	 parent	firm	 should	 be	 able	 to	 positively	 influence	 the	
subsidiary’s	performance	and	thus	its	global	integration.	Thus,
Hypothesis 1:  subsidiary performance will be positively associated with inter-subsidiary 
knowledge	asset	transfer.
Hypothesis	2:	Association	Between	Mandate	Status	and	Subsidiary	Performance
By	a	subsidiary	mandate,	the	parent	firm	gives	a	subsidiary	the	responsibility	to	undertake	
certain	activities	on	behalf	of	the	corporation	as	a	whole,	implying	international	rather	
than	just	local	responsibility	for	these	activities	(Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998).	We	argue	that	
such	 a	 “mandate	 status”	 should	 increase	 subsidiary	 performance.	A	 subsidiary	 that	 is	
granted a mandate has probably already demonstrated either superior competencies in the 
past or at least an ability to develop such superior competencies (andersson et al. 2002; 
Forsgren et al. 2000),	and	by	conducting	the	corresponding	activities	on	a	larger	scale,	it	
should be able to further develop these competencies (Frost et al. 2002). superior compe-
tencies,	in	turn,	are	positively	related	to	superior	performance	(e.g.,	Delios	and	Beamish	
1999),	so	that	mandate	status	and	superior	performance	should	be	positively	associated.
Second,	a	subsidiary	that	is	granted	a	mandate	can	probably	increase	its	investments	in	
competence	development	because	assuming	an	advanced	role	in	the	MNC	network—for	
which	a	mandate	is	likely	to	be	a	signal—is	typically	accompanied	by	additional	resource	
investments	made	by	the	parent	firm	in	the	subsidiary	(Birkinshaw	and	Hood	1998; Frost 
et al. 2002).	Since	greater	investments	stimulate	the	development	of	competencies	(e.g.,	
Barney 1991;	Dierickx	and	Cool	1989; Frost et al. 2002),	mandate	status	and	superior	
performance should be positively associated.
Third,	subsidiaries	with	a	mandate	often	exhibit	highly	specialized,	hard-to-imitate—
and	 thus,	 rare—competencies	 (Birkinshaw	et	 al.	 1998; cantwell and Mudambi 2005). 
Such	rare	competencies	increase	the	subsidiary’s	power	inside	the	MNC	network	(Bou-
quet	and	Birkinshaw	2008). this increased power should provide the focal subsidiary with 
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an improved bargaining position that enables it to directly appropriate a higher level of the 
rents	that	are	available	within	the	intra-MNC	network	(Mudambi	and	Navarra	2004).
Therefore,	by	giving	the	focal	subsidiary	a	mandate,	the	parent	firm	should	be	able	to	
positively	influence	the	subsidiary’s	performance	and	thus	its	global	integration.	Thus,
Hypothesis 2:  subsidiary performance will be positively associated with the possession 
of	a	subsidiary	mandate	received	from	the	parent	firm.
Hypotheses	3a	and	3b:	Association	Between	Autonomy	and	Subsidiary	Performance
We	model	 subsidiary	 autonomy	 by	 two	 distinct	 categories:	 strategic and operational 
autonomy,	following	relevant	literature	that	recommends	this	differentiation	(Bartlett	and	
Ghoshal 1989;	Birkinshaw	1996;	Birkinshaw	and	Morrison	1995;	Nobel	and	Birkinshaw	
1998;	Vereecke	et	al.	2006).	We	believe	this	differentiation	is	important	since	“autonomy	
is	a	rather	fuzzy	concept	unless	the	distinction	is	drawn	between	strategic	autonomy	and	
operational	autonomy”	(Glaister	et	al.	2003,	p.	320).	Strategic	autonomy	is	defined	as	the	
subsidiary’s	ability	 to	set	 its	own	agenda,	whereas	operational	autonomy	 is	defined	as	
the ability to manage designated activities in a way determined by the subsidiary itself 
(Bailyn 1985; Perlow 1998).
We	argue	that	strategic	autonomy	will	have	negative	implications	for	the	subsidiary’s	
performance	and	its	integration	in	the	MNC.	Put	differently,	autonomy	can	imply	a	lack	
of,	endanger	or	actually	damage	integration	of	the	subsidiary	into	the	intra-firm	network	
(Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998).	This	effect	is	likely	to	be	stronger	the	more	the	subsidiary	has	
the	power	 to	determine	 its	own	agenda,	 i.e.	 the	more	strategic	autonomy	it	has.	 If	 the	
MNC	wants	to	ensure	the	seamless	integration	of	a	specific	subsidiary’s	capabilities	into	
the	intra-MNC	network,	it	is	highly	likely	to	endow	that	subsidiary	with	less autonomy 
to	determine	its	own	agenda,	i.e.	to	reduce	its	strategic	autonomy	(Frost	et	al.	2002). For 
example,	Ambos	and	Schlegelmilch	(2007)	found	that	the	“international	creator”	type	of	
subsidiary,	i.e.	one	with	distinct	proprietary	competence	which	the	MNC	wishes	to	spread	
throughout	the	global	organization,	had	the	highest	degree	of	centralization	and	the	least	
freedom	to	determine	its	own	agenda.	Thus,	 the	more	 tightly	 integrated	the	subsidiary	
becomes	in	the	corporate	system,	the	more	decisions	of	a	truly	strategic	nature	are	taken	
out	of	the	subsidiary’s	hand	and	held	at	a	corporate	level	(Birkinshaw	et	al.	2005,	p.	235,	
emphasis added).
The	integration	of	highly	autonomous	subsidiaries	is	likely	to	be	lower	due	to	a	lack	of	
coordination	between	the	parent	firm	and	the	subsidiary	which	could	lead	to	the	subsidi-
ary’s	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	organization;	with	a	high	degree	of	strategic	autonomy,	
“the	subsidiary	can	drop	‘out	of	the	loop’	and	weaken	its	intra-firm	position”	(Cantwell	
and Mudambi 2005,	 p.	1114).	With	 increasing	 isolation	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	MNC,	 it	
becomes	 less	 likely	 that	 the	 subsidiary’s	 capabilities	 and	 resources	 are	 recognized	 as	
being	beneficial	to	the	overall	MNC	network	(Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998) so that the parent 
company may be less inclined to foster the further development of these capabilities and 
resources by additional investments (Frost et al. 2002).
Moreover,	the	capabilities	and	resources	a	subsidiary	develops	and	uses	in	isolation	
are	potentially	less	compatible	with	the	capability	and	resource	stocks	controlled	by	other	
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units	within	the	MNC.	This	may	limit	the	subsidiary’s	ability	to	benefit	from	the	capabili-
ties	and	resources	available	in	the	MNC	network	(Kogut	and	Zander	1992,	2003).	Further,	
the	 subsidiary	 should	be	 interested	 in	promoting	 such	compatibility,	 since	 recombina-
tions of capabilities and resources from different locations are especially hard to imitate 
(McEvily	and	Chakravarthy	2002).	Therefore,	 if	 the	subsidiary	can	recombine	its	own	
resources	and	capabilities	with	those	of	other	organizational	units,	it	may	well	achieve	an	
improved	inimitability	of	its	resource	base.	This,	in	turn,	may	improve	its	financial	per-
formance	in	the	long	run	since	the	uniqueness	of	a	resource	increases	with	its	inimitability	
(Barney 1991).	Finally,	when	other	units	are	less	able	to	make	use	of	the	capabilities	and	
resources	developed	by	the	focal	subsidiary,	the	role	of	this	subsidiary	within	the	MNC	is	
weakened	(Forsgren	and	Pedersen	2000; Forsgren et al. 2000).	The	financial	performance	
of a subsidiary with high strategic autonomy may therefore be hampered by a reduced 
ability	to	influence	strategic	decisions	of	the	MNC	and	to	appropriate	firm-internal	rents	
(Mudambi and Navarra 2004).	Therefore,	the	less	a	subsidiary	can	alter	its	resource	base	
and	capabilities	independently,	the	lower	should	the	probability	be	that	such	changes	will	
lead	to	incompatibility.	Thus,
Hypothesis 3a:  subsidiary performance will be negatively associated with the subsidi-
ary’s level of strategic autonomy.
the degree of operational autonomy a subsidiary possesses designates the range and 
extent	of	preset	tasks	it	may	address	autonomously.	One	of	the	areas	in	which	an	opera-
tionally	 autonomous	 subsidiary	might	make	 its	 own	decisions	 is	 the	 cooperation	with	
external	firms	and	organizations	which	is	largely	an	operational,	rather	than	a	strategic	
issue	(Nobel	and	Birkinshaw	1998).	Being	allowed	to	collaborate	with	external	partners	
of	its	own	choice,	the	subsidiary	is	probably	better	able	to	form	favorable	linkages	with	
parties in its local environment (andersson and Forsgren 2000;	Birkinshaw	et	al.	1998). 
Thus,	 it	can	learn	more	from	the	local	system	of	 innovation	and	better	use	and	recog-
nize	 local	 resources	 and	 competencies	 (Andersson	 et	 al.	 2002; Pearce 1999; Rugman 
and	Verbeke	2001).	Indeed,	knowledge	about	external	opportunities	can	be	considered	a	
resource itself (cyert et al. 1993).	Thus,	the	higher	its	operational	autonomy,	the	more	the	
subsidiary	should	be	able	to	learn	from	external	sources	and	thus	to	improve	its	resource	
base.	With	 its	stronger	knowledge	about	external	opportunities,	a	subsidiary	with	high	
operational autonomy should also be more responsive to these opportunities which has 
been found to improve performance (Zahra and covin 1995).
Additionally,	a	subsidiary	that	is	granted	only	little	operational	autonomy	by	its	parent	
firm	is	likely	bound	to	provide	its	employees	with	less	operational	autonomy	than	it	could	
if	 it	 had	 received	more	 operational	 autonomy	 itself.	Yet,	 operational	 autonomy	 gives	
employees	the	opportunity	to	“approach	problems	in	ways	that	make	the	most	of	their	
expertise	and	creative-thinking	skills”	(Amabile	1997,	p.	82)	and	thus	fosters	their	intrinsic	
motivation,	creativity,	and	finally	organizational	innovation	(Amabile	1997; Glynn 1996). 
Therefore,	subsidiaries	are	 likely	 to	create	both	new	knowledge	and	competencies	due	
to their operational freedom (ambos and schlegelmilch 2007,	p.	476,	emphasis	added).	
Moreover,	this	knowledge	and	these	competencies	should	be	relevant	to	the	rest	of	the	
firm,	since	the	tight	control	the	parent	firm	is	able	to	exert	on	the	subsidiary’s	agenda	will	
likely	avoid	duplication	and	irrelevance	of	any	knowledge	the	subsidiary	creates.
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Finally,	knowledge	assets	created	by	 the	 interaction	of	 the	 subsidiary	with	 its	 local	
environment	may	be	hard	to	imitate	for	other	units	within	the	MNC	network.	Thus,	such	
knowledge	assets	can	be	very	attractive	to	and	create	a	lot	of	value	for	these	other	units.	
The	expected	demand	for	such	rare	assets	may	therefore	provide	the	focal	subsidiary	with	
a	 stronger	 bargaining	position	within	 the	MNC,	 allowing	 it	 to	 appropriate	more	firm-
internal rents (Mudambi and Navarra 2004).	Therefore,
Hypothesis 3b:  subsidiary performance will be positively associated with the subsidi-
ary’s level of operational autonomy.
Data and Methods
Population and sampling Frame
Our sample consisted of subsidiaries with a main responsibility for research and develop-
ment	(R&D).	We	used	the	database	Thomson One	 to	identify	Swiss	and	German	firms	
irrespective	of	their	industry	affiliation.	We	focused	on	Swiss	and	German	firms	because	
they	are	characterized	by	a	high	degree	of	R&D	internationalization	(Serapio	and	Dalton	
1999).	The	search	yielded	a	list	of	1254	firms	(983	German,	271	Swiss).
We	only	retained	those	firms	that	were	MNCs	and	which	had	deliberately	set	up	an	
international R&D structure (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989).	We	checked	these	criteria	by	
reading	 the	annual	 report	of	 every	firm	and	by	making	additional	 confirmatory	phone	
calls.	This	process	resulted	in	the	exclusion	of	750	firms	from	the	sampling	frame.	The	
remaining	 504	 firms	 accounted	 for	 an	 average	 of	 68%	of	 all	 sales	 in	 their	 respective	
industry.	We	then	contacted	the	top	management	of	these	remaining	firms,	explained	our	
research	topic	and	asked	for	participation	in	the	study.	159	firms	(104	German,	55	Swiss)	
chose to cooperate. correspondence with corporate-level senior R&D managers of these 
firms	led	to	the	identification	of	923	foreign	subsidiaries.	These	constituted	the	population	
from which we drew our random sample.
item Development
Our measurement approach is largely based on the collection of psychometric survey 
data from individual informants. the use of such shared unit-level constructs (Klein and 
Kozlowski	2000)	 is	of	course	an	approximation	as	different	 individuals	have	different	
perceptions	about	subsidiary	characteristics,	and	thus	the	projection	of	individual-level	
cognition	 to	 the	 organizational	 level	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 heuristic	 (Schneider	 and	
angelmar 1993).	However,	the	interviews	during	the	item	revision	phase	suggested	that	
a	subsidiary’s	general	or	top	R&D	manager	would	likely	be	in	a	position	to	make	sound	
assessments.	We	therefore	think	our	approach	is	acceptable	as	it	can	be	presumed	that	
individual top-level employees are most familiar with their subsidiary’s characteristics 
and	its	relationships	with	other	units	in	the	firm.
For	item	generation,	we	conducted	a	careful	review	of	the	relevant	literature	and	related	
scales.	With	the	exception	of	the	variable	“inter-subsidiary	knowledge	asset	transfer”,	all	
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measures	were	adopted	from	existing	scales.	As	to	the	best	of	our	knowledge	no	scale	to	
measure	“inter-subsidiary	knowledge	asset	transfer”	is	available,	we	employed	a	rigor-
ous	item	creation	and	validation	process	for	this	scale,	following	recommendations	in	the	
measurement literature (churchill 1979; schriesheim et al. 1993). this process started 
with a preliminary item list that we produced based on the literature review and consisted 
of iterative rounds of discussions with international academics and R&D managers from 
four	MNCs	to	ensure	content,	face,	and	external	validity	of	our	emerging	construct.	To	
incorporate	 their	feedback,	we	made	substantive	changes	 to	 the	 latest	 list	 if	necessary,	
and discussed the revised list again with professors and managers until both groups came 
to	the	conclusion	that	no	further	clarifications	and	amendments	would	be	necessary.	This	
process	enabled	us	to	produce	a	carefully	tested	questionnaire	instrument.
Measurement
all constructs considered in this investigation refer to the subsidiary as the unit of analy-
sis.	Accordingly,	all	variables	were	specified	on	the	subsidiary	level.	The	items	and	scales	
are	reproduced	in	appendix	A.	All	scales	were	constructed	by	adding	up	individual	item	
scores and dividing the sum by the number of items in the scale (Dess and Davis 1984; 
trevor and Nyberg 2008).
Dependent Variable
Subsidiary performance was measured by a three item scale that we adapted from Bir-
kinshaw	and	Morrison	(1995).	We	used	seven-point	items	anchored	at	“we	perform	much	
worse	than	the	parent	firm”	(1)	and	“we	perform	much	better	than	the	parent	firm”	(7).	
Given	the	above	scale	construction	method,	the	scale	is	conditioned	on	values	between	1	
and	7,	which	is	why	we	prefer	Tobit	models	for	analysis	(Cronbach’s	alpha	=	0.8990).
Independent Variables
Knowledge asset transfer	was	measured	by	a	self-developed	six	item	scale	anchored	at	
“not	at	all”	(1)	and	“to	a	great	extent”	(7).	It	measures	the	extent	to	which	knowledge	
assets developed by the focal subsidiary were of use in sister units (alpha =	0.9378).
Operational autonomy and strategic autonomy were measured by scales that we adapted 
from	Nobel	and	Birkinshaw’s	(1998)	“centralization”	scale1; the items were anchored at 
“headquarters	decide”	(1)	and	“subsidiary	decides”	(7).	“Strategic	autonomy”	is	defined	
as	 the	 subsidiary’s	 ability	 to	 set	 its	 own	 agenda,	 whereas	 “operational	 autonomy”	 is	
defined	as	 the	ability	 to	deal	with	designated	day-to-day	 issues	autonomously	 (Bailyn	
1985; Perlow 1998) (alpha =	0.6892	for	strategic	and	0.6862	for	operational	autonomy).
Subsidiary mandate status was measured by a dichotomous indicator originally devel-
oped	by	Birkinshaw	et	al.	(1998).	We	asked	the	respondents	“Does	your	subsidiary	under-
take	any	R&D	activity	on	behalf	of	the	corporation	as	a	whole?”.	This	indicator	was	coded	
“1”	if	the	subsidiary	has	received	a	mandate	from	the	parent	firm,	and	“0”	otherwise.
222 M. M. Keupp et al.
Control Variables
Tacitness of subsidiary’s knowledge. By combining items from Zander and Kogut’s 
(1995)	“teachability”	and	“codifiability”	scales,	we	created	the	scale	for	our	control	vari-
able	 “tacitness”.	 It	measures	 how	 easily	 the	 subsidiary’s	 knowledge	 can	 be	 described	
and	learned;	the	items	were	anchored	at	“strongly	disagree”	(1)	and	“strongly	agree”	(7)	
(alpha =	0.8312).
Observability of subsidiary’s knowledge.	We	control	for	observability	by	including	the	
three-item	scale	of	Birkinshaw	et	al.	(2002).	It	measures	how	well	the	subsidiary’s	knowl-
edge	can	be	learned	by	observation;	the	items	were	again	anchored	at	“strongly	disagree”	
(1)	and	“strongly	agree”	(7)	(alpha	=	0.7768).
Demographic controls.	We	control	for	subsidiary R&D intensity	by	its	R&D	expenses	
relative	 to	 its	 budget,	 for	 subsidiary size	 by	 the	 logged	 number	 of	 its	 employees,	 for	
subsidiary age by subtracting the year in which the subsidiary started operations for 
the	parent	firm	from	2009,	for	subsidiary location by individual country dummies and 
for subsidiary industry by individual industry dummies on the two-digit level using the 
NACE	classification.
Questionnaire,	Data	Collection	Procedure	and	Post-Hoc	Tests
We	produced	a	fully	standardized	questionnaire	by	following	validated	academic	proce-
dures	of	questionnaire	design	(Dillman	2000).	For	data	collection,	each	firm	was	emailed	
a	copy	of	 the	questionnaire	 together	with	a	cover	 letter	 that	explained	 the	aims	of	 the	
study,	guaranteed	complete	confidentiality,	and	offered	the	study	results	as	an	incentive	
to	cooperate.	By	short	telephone	calls	we	announced	the	arrival	of	the	questionnaire	and	
asked	the	subsidiary’s	general	manager	or	 top	R&D	manager	(our	key	informants)	for	
cooperation.
We	emailed	reminder	letters	to	all	managers	that	had	not	yet	responded	14	and	30	days	
after	the	original	questionnaire	had	been	emailed.	From	the	total	of	923	subsidiaries,	290	
responded,	yielding	a	favorable	response	rate	of	31.42%.	Three	observations	could	not	be	
used	due	to	too	much	missing	data,	thus	287	complete	observations	remained	for	subse-
quent	analysis.	Missing	data	were	few	and	completely	at	random.
We	 then	 carried	 out	 several	 post-hoc	 analyses	 and	 validation	 surveys	 to	 assure	 the	
representativeness of respondent data and to validate responses received from informants. 
No	significant	response	bias	by	response	vs.	non-response,	response	time,	and	subsidiary	
demographic characteristics were detected.
Further,	 to	minimize	common	method	variance,	we	validated	data	collection	by	 re-
collecting	data	on	the	dependent	variable	“subsidiary	performance”	from	the	respective	
parent	firm	and	by	re-collecting	the	complete	questionnaire	data	from	a	second	manager	
in	the	subsidiary	six	weeks	after	initial	data	collection	using	randomly	drawn	subsam-
ples.	High	inter-rater	reliability	between	the	original	and	the	confirmation	data	alleviated	
common method bias concerns (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).	Further,	 there	was	 no	
evidence	of	a	large	number	of	subsidiaries	responding	from	a	single	MNC,	so	that	our	
sample	is	unlikely	to	be	biased	by	possible	cluster	effects.
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assessment of Reliability and Validity of Measures
We	relied	on	diverse	approaches	to	test	the	reliability	and	validity	of	both	our	items	and	
our scales. all applied methods consistently suggest high levels of reliability and valid-
ity.2	To	test	 the	reliability	of	our	 items,	we	calculated	item-test,	 item-rest,	and	average	
inter-item	correlations.	On	the	scale	level,	we	calculated	Cronbach’s	alpha	for	each	scale	
(cf. Nunnally and Bernstein 1994).
To	examine	the	convergent	and	discriminant	validity	of	our	measures,	we	relied	on	psy-
chometric methods. Convergent validity of our items was established by calculating over-
lap-corrected3 correlations between an item and the scale it pertains to (cf. Nunnally and 
Bernstein 1994) and convergent validity of our scales by applying principal component 
factor	analysis	with	oblique	rotation.4	Ultimately,	23	items	were	retained	which	formed	
six	scales.5 table 1	reports	loadings,	cross-loadings,	and	communalities	for	these	items.	
the scales capture the subsidiary’s performance (cronbach’s alpha =	0.8990),	its	opera-
tional autonomy (alpha =	0.6862),	its	strategic	autonomy	(alpha	=	0.6892),	its	knowledge	
asset transfer (alpha =	0.9378),	the	tacitness	of	its	knowledge	(alpha	=	0.8312)	as	well	as	
the	observability	of	its	knowledge	(alpha	=	0.7768).
Together,	these	six	factors	explain	70.09%	of	the	variance.	Direct	factor	loadings	were	
high	 (all	 above	0.60),	while	no	cross-loading	exceeded	0.30,	 indicating	a	high	degree	
of convergent validity (hair et al. 1998).	We	 used	Harman’s	 one-factor	 test	 to	 assess	
potential common method variance induced by our use of single informants to measure 
corporate	characteristics.	The	fact	that	six	factors	emerged	and	that	the	first	factor	only	
explained	20.50%	of	the	variance	makes	it	unlikely	that	common	method	variance	is	a	
major	concern	(Podsakoff	and	Organ	1986).
We	then	examined	item	discriminant validity by using a multitrait and multi-item cor-
relation	matrix	approach	in	which	the	correlation	of	each	item	with	each	scale	is	examined	
(Ware	and	Gandek	1998).	We	further	calculated	average	variance	extracted	and	compared	
its	square	root	to	the	correlation	coefficients	among	the	scales	(Fornell	and	Larcker	1981; 
staples et al. 1999). Both analyses suggested a high level of discriminant validity.
Results
Descriptive statistics and Results of hypothesis testing
table 2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables. since the depend-
ent	variable	is	conditioned	on	values	between	1	and	7,	we	fit	Tobit	models	to	our	data.	
All	estimates	use	 robust	 (Huber-White)	 standard	errors	 to	correct	 for	potential	hetero-
scedasticity.	All	models	were	constructed	 incrementally	by	first	entering	only	 the	con-
trols in a baseline model and then adding the covariates of each hypothesis step by step. 
We	compared	the	respective	model	fits	by	calculating	Akaike	information	criteria	(AIC);	
this procedure suggested that the full model which includes all independent variables 
and	controls	fits	the	data	best.	Since	all	industry	and	country	dummies,	respectively,	are	
perfectly	collinear,	the	machinery	industry	and	Germany	serve	as	the	respective	baseline	
categories in all models. table 3 shows estimation results for the different models.
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Table 3: Robust tobit estimates for dependent variable subsidiary performancea,	b
Model	1	(Base-
line model)
Model	2 Model	3 Model	4	(Full	
model)
Knowledge asset transfer 0.144**	(0.056) 0.123*	(0.058) 0.125*	(0.058)
subsidiary mandate 0.316*	(0.158) 0.307*	(0.158)
strategic autonomy 0.009	(0.069)
Operational autonomy 0.180*	(0.076)
tacitness 0.074	(0.073)	 0.093	(0.076) 0.088	(0.076) 0.085	(0.074)
Observability −0.028	(0.072) −0.035	(0.074) −0.035	(0.073) −0.022	(0.072)
R&D intensity −0.000	(0.003) −0.002	(0.003) −0.002	(0.003) −0.004	(0.003)
Size 0.080	(0.044) 0.029	(0.047) 0.013	(0.045) 0.007	(0.045)
age 0.003	(0.003) 0.001	(0.003) 0.002	(0.003) 0.003	(0.003)
Switzerland 0.734**	(0.283) 0.681*	(0.279) 0.687**	(0.274) 0.636*	(0.279)
USA 0.203	(0.269) 0.227	(0.262) 0.232	(0.257) 0.203	(0.274)
china −0.092	(0.289) 0.094	(0.303) 0.074	(0.296) 0.035	(0.301)
italy 0.426	(0.521) 0.325	(0.526) 0.353	(0.531) 0.376	(0.516)
France −0.081	(0.417) −0.183	(0.434) −0.162	(0.416) −0.068	(0.401)
UK 0.752*	(0.352) 0.667*	(0.330) 0.698*	(0.331) 0.634	(0.347)
Other	Western	Europe 0.068	(0.244) 0.044	(0.248) 0.049	(0.240) −0.023	(0.249)
eastern europe 0.060	(0.351) 0.196	(0.381) 0.210	(0.373) 0.217	(0.396)
Other america 0.024	(0.570) 0.297	(0.567) 0.306	(0.579) 0.342	(0.586)
Other asia 0.841*	(0.343) 0.900**	(0.326) 0.896**	(0.326) 0.783*	(0.335)
Other locations 0.407	(0.335) 0.570	(0.346) 0.605	(0.314) 0.682*	(0.326)
electronics −0.014	(0.240) −0.071	(0.248) −0.064	(0.244) −0.019	(0.244)
chemicals −0.011	(0.269) −0.024	(0.276) −0.034	(0.270) 0.037	(0.273)
Pharmaceuticals −0.303	(0.343) −0.225	(0.340) −0.262	(0.328) −0.228	(0.327)
Basic metals 0.942*	(0.413) 1.125**	(0.411) 1.179	**(0.405) 1.219**	(0.390)
automotive 0.580*	(0.271) 0.512	(0.273) 0.502	(0.275) 0.623*	(0.291)
Other	transport	equip. −0.591	(0.383) −0.528	(0.381) −0.646	(0.380) −0.613	(0.395)
Electrical	equipment 0.238	(0.440) 0.282	(0.409) 0.295	(0.398) 0.396	(0.431)
Other industries −0.338	(0.236) −0.332	(0.243) −0.316	(0.240) −0.217	(0.237)
constant 3.272***	(0.369) 2.959***	(0.387) 2.950***	
(0.387)
1.984***	
(0.559)
Log-pseudolikelihood −381.102 −369.516 −367.564 −357.151
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.046 0.057 0.062 0.069
F statistic (d. f.) 2.23***	(24;	
223)
2.63***	(25;	217) 2.91***	(26;	
216)
2.80***	(28;	
208)
aic 814.204 793.031 791.127 774.301
Number of observations 247 242 242 236
a*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001	(two-tailed	test).	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses
bBaseline categories are Germany for the country and Machinery for the industry dummies
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For	all	hypotheses	but	one,	the	found	signs	match	the	predicted	signs.	Three	of	the	four	
hypotheses are supported at p <	0.05:	H1	which	posited	a	positive	relationship	between	
knowledge	asset	transfer	and	the	subsidiary’s	performance,	H2	which	predicted	a	positive	
relationship	between	its	mandate	status	and	its	performance,	and	H3b	which	posited	a	
positive relationship between the subsidiary’s operational autonomy and its performance. 
H3a	which	asserted	a	negative	relationship	between	the	subsidiary’s	strategic	autonomy	
and	its	performance	fails	to	gain	support.	Additionally,	we	find	some	of	the	control	vari-
ables	are	significant:	Subsidiaries	 located	 in	Switzerland,	 in	Non-Chinese	Asia,	and	 in	
“other	locations”	tend	to	achieve	a	significantly	higher	performance	(all	at	p	<	0.05)	than	
subsidiaries located in Germany (our reference category).
Sensitivity	Tests	and	Alternative	Specifications
We	performed	 additional	 analyses	 to	 ensure	 the	 validity	 of	 these	 results.	 First,	 robust	
Ols regression models6,	standardized	normal	probability	plots,	Shapiro-Wilk	and	Kol-
mogorov-smirnov tests all indicated that the tobit model assumptions were met and the 
estimated	coefficients	and	standard	errors	were	stable.	To	assess	whether	multicollinearity	
of	measures	was	a	problem,	we	computed	variance	inflation	factor	(VIF)	indices.	Both	the	
maximum	(2.16)	and	the	mean	VIF	(1.54)	are	well	below	the	threshold	of	10,	alleviating	
multicollinearity concerns (chatterjee et al. 2000).	While	the	magnitude	of	coefficients	
reflected	 the	 differences	 of	OLS	 vs.	Tobit	model	metrics,	 the	 patterns	 of	 significance	
across	all	hypothesized	coefficients	as	well	as	their	signs	remained	stable
Second,	 since	our	measurement	approach	 is	 largely	based	on	 the	collection	of	psy-
chometric	 survey	data	 from	 individual	 informants,	we	also	applied	structural	equation	
modeling	(SEM)	to	control	for	latent	variable	effects.	With	the	exception	of	the	country	
dummies,	all	independent	and	control	variables	of	our	full	regression	model	were	entered	
as	exogenous	variables	and	the	dependent	variable	as	the	endogenous	variable	into	the	
structural	equation	model.7	Covariances	between	the	exogenous	variables	were	modeled	
if	the	respective	exogenous	variables	could	be	theoretically	expected	to	covary	and	if	the	
corresponding	modification	index	was	above	10.0	(cf.	Denison	et	al.	1996; sabherwal et al. 
2006),	indicating	that	including	this	covariance	substantially	improves	model	fit.
Figure 1	depicts	the	structure	of	the	model	using	maximum	likelihood	(ML)	estimation	
and	 reports	 standardized	 factor	 loadings	and	path	coefficients.	The	model	fits	 the	data	
adequately	(χ2 =	686.807	with	509	d.f.,	p	<	0.000;	GFI	=	0.862;	AGFI	=	0.829;	NFI	=	0.812;	
NNFi =	0.932;	CFI	=	0.942;	RMSEA	=	0.039)	(e.g.,	Bollen	1989; Kline 2005). as it can be 
seen from Fig. 1,	this	model,	too,	supports	H1	(p	<	0.01),	H2	(p	<	0.10),	and	H3b	(p	<	0.05),	
whereas	H3a	fails	to	gain	support.	Thus,	the	Tobit	model	results	are	confirmed.
Discussion
Our	study	articulated	and	tested	a	model	of	how	the	parent	firm	of	an	MNC	can	achieve	
global	integration	of	subsidiaries	by	using	managerial	“tools”	to	manipulate	the	MNC’s	
formal	organizational	architecture.	We	used	subsidiary	performance	as	an	observable	cri-
terion	to	measure	integration	success.	The	empirical	results	confirm	our	theoretical	argu-
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ments	that	the	parent	firm	can	actively	improve	a	subsidiary’s	performance	and	hence	its	
integration	by	encouraging	inter-subsidiary	knowledge	asset	transfer,	assigning	subsidi-
ary	mandates,	and	providing	operational	autonomy.	These	results	have	implications	for	
the literature and for managers.
First,	we	extend	previous	research	on	how	integration	can	be	achieved.	Our	study	is	
one	of	the	first	to	provide	an	unusually	detailed	account	of	the	links	between	managerial	
action	by	“tools”	that	manipulate	organizational	structure	and	successful	integration.	It	
helps	close	the	frequently	highlighted	knowledge	gap	concerning	the	link	between	mana-
gerial	action	and	integration	(e.g.,	Ambos	and	Ambos	2009;	Björkman	et	al.	2004; Bou-
quet	and	Birkinshaw	2008; Foss and Pedersen 2002,	2004; luo 2002; Persaud 2005;	Wu	
et al. 2007).	The	mechanisms	of	managerial	“tools”	we	study	allow	academics	and	man-
agers	to	track	how	the	theoretical	benefits	of	global	integration	can	actually	be	achieved.	
This	knowledge	is	in	high	demand	(e.g.,	Andersson	et	al.	2002; Ghoshal 1986; Ghoshal 
and Nohria 1989;	Rosenzweig	and	Singh	1991;	Yamin	and	Sinkovics	2009).
Fig. 1:	 Structural	equation	model.	(For	reasons	of	readability,	the	figure	shows	only	extracts	of	the	model	that	
was	estimated.	The	estimation	included	further	control	variables,	viz.:	R&D	intensity,	subsidiary	size,	subsidi-
ary	age,	and	industry	dummies	(as	 in	 the	regression	models,	 the	machinery	industry	served	as	 the	reference	
category	and	was	omitted	from	the	analysis).	Some	covariances	among	exogenous	variables	were	modeled,	but	
are	not	reported	here	either.	Error	variables	are	also	excluded	from	the	presentation.	Extensive	results	are	avail-
able	from	the	corresponding	author	upon	request.	See	the	appendix	for	a	full	account	of	each	item’s	wording.	
Standardized	estimates	are	reported.	Model	fit:	χ2 = 686.807	with	509	d.f.,	p	=	0.000;	GFI	=	0.862;	AGFI	=	0.829;	
NFi =	0.812;	NNFI	=	0.932;	CFI	=	0.942;	RMSEA	=	0.039.	†p	<	0.10;	*p	<	0.05;	**p	<	0.01;	***p	<	0.001	 (two-
tailed	test).	In	order	to	scale	the	factors,	one	indicator	per	factor	was	assigned	a	fixed	unstandardized	loading	of	
1.0.	Therefore,	one	loading	per	factor	cannot	be	tested	for	statistical	significance	(Kline	2005))
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Given	the	tendency	among	many	MNCs	to	re-centralize	or	completely	localize	activi-
ties,	the	problems	with	global	integration	seem	overwhelming	(Benito	et	al.	2003; currie 
and Kerrin 2004;	Doz	et	al.	2006; Fors 1997; Pearce 1990; Rugman 2005).	We	could	
show	that	successful	integration	is	possible	when	firms	take	appropriate	actions	to	induce	
it,	making	a	case	that	global	integration	is	possible	if	appropriate	“tools”	are	used.
By	using	subsidiary	performance	as	a	measure	for	successful	integration,	we	also	con-
tribute to the investigation of antecedents of subsidiary performance on which empir-
ically	 validated	 knowledge	 is	 very	 scarce	 (Monteiro	 et	 al.	 2008).	The	finding	 that	 by	
encouraging	knowledge	asset	transfers	from	the	subsidiary	to	other	organizational	sub-
units,	the	parent	firm	can	actively	promote	subsidiary	performance	extends	prior	research	
that	analyzes	the	effect	of	knowledge	sharing	on	the	performance	of	an	individual	unit	
(e.g.,	Monteiro	et	al.	2008; tsai 2001).	Whereas	these	previous	observations	of	a	posi-
tive	association	did	not	account	for	the	extent	to	which	the	recipient	has	actually	used	the	
transferred	knowledge,	our	results	suggest	that	the	positive	association	persists	when	the	
extent	of	knowledge	use	is	considered.	Moreover,	this	finding	responds	to	the	call	that	the	
actual	outcomes	of	knowledge-based	production,	rather	than	the	transfer	of	knowledge	
itself,	should	be	studied	(Ambos	and	Ambos	2009; haas and hansen 2005; Kotabe and 
Mudambi 2004; Yamin and Otto 2004).	Further,	our	use	of	subsidiary	performance	as	the	
dependent	construct	allows	us	to	extend	previous	studies	that	have	used	knowledge-based	
perspectives	to	study	global	integration	(e.g.,	Björkman	et	al.	2004; Foss and Pedersen 
2002),	corroborating	theoretical	predictions	that	multidimensional	conceptualizations	of	
global	 integration	may	 be	 fruitfully	 employed	 in	 large-sample	 empirical	 testing	 (e.g.,	
Persaud 2005; Yeniyurt et al. 2005).
We	 found	 no	 support	 for	 the	 hypothesized	 negative	 association	 between	 strategic	
autonomy and subsidiary performance. this could be due to the fact that a subsidiary 
empowered	to	decide	about	strategic	issues	independently	is	unlikely	to	use	this	freedom	
to	detach	itself	from	the	MNC’s	global	organization.	Rather,	such	a	subsidiary	is	likely	to	
behave	such	that	it	can	still	reap	the	benefits	of	intra-firm	collaboration	while	maintain-
ing its relatively high degree of independence (cf. cantwell and Mudambi 2005; Persaud 
2005).
Moreover,	 our	 results	 suggest	 that	 strategic	 and	 operational	 autonomy	do	 not	 have	
the	same	effect	on	successful	global	integration.	We	believe	that	the	distinction	between	
strategic	and	operational	autonomy	can	at	least	partly	explain	why	the	overall	findings	
regarding	autonomy	are	unclear	(see	Birkinshaw	and	Morrison	1995;	Nobel	and	Birkin-
shaw 1998;	Vereecke	et	al.	2006).	Thus,	our	findings	answer	the	repeated	call	for	a	better	
understanding of the autonomy construct (ambos and schlegelmilch 2007; Glaister et 
al. 2003; Young and tavares 2004).	Our	study	is	among	the	first	to	explicitly	formulate	
separate	hypotheses	for	strategic	and	operational	autonomy.	We	believe	that	our	findings	
and theoretical arguments open up promising paths for future research that can build on 
our results to deepen the theoretical understanding and nuances of subsidiary autonomy.
By	highlighting	the	association	between	integration	and	subsidiary	performance,	our	
study	complements	the	literature	that	stresses	the	benefits	of	integration	from	the	parent	
company’s	or	the	overall	MNC’s	view	(e.g.,	Bartlett	and	Ghoshal	1989; cavusgil et al. 
2004; townsend et al. 2004; Yeniyurt et al. 2005; Zou and cavusgil 2002). there are 
basically	 two	ways	 for	 a	 subsidiary	 to	 attain	 superior	financial	performance—first,	by	
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being	successful	on	 the	external	market,	and	second,	by	using	 its	bargaining	power	 to	
appropriate more internal rents (Mudambi and Navarra 2004). Our hypotheses are built 
on	both	arguments,	suggesting	that	the	parent	firm’s	endeavors	to	integrate	the	subsidi-
ary	more	tightly	into	the	MNC’s	global	network	allow	the	subsidiary	to	improve	both	its	
supply	for	the	external	market	and	its	firm-internal	bargaining	position.	We	acknowledge	
the	argument	that	internal	rent-seeking	by	subsidiaries	may	be	inefficient	from	a	parent	
firm	perspective	(Mudambi	and	Navarra	2004,	p.	386),	implying	that	superior	subsidiary	
performance does not necessarily entail superior corporate performance.8	Yet,	given	that	
the	above	 literature	 linking	 integration	and	overall	firm	performance	consistently	 sug-
gests	that	global	integration	is	profitable	from	the	overall	firm’s	perspective,	it	seems	that	
the parent company and its subsidiaries have a common interest in a successful global 
integration of the MNc. this bears an important implication for those future studies that 
aim	 to	 explain	why	 a	 considerable	 share	 of	MNCs	 apparently	 experiences	 substantial	
problems	in	realizing	the	prospective	benefits	of	becoming	an	integrated	company:	we	
show	that	these	problems	are	unlikely	to	be	rooted	in	categorical	subsidiary	resistance	
against the parent’s strategy.
Our	findings	also	have	a	number	of	managerial	implications.	First,	parent	firm	man-
agers	can	benefit	from	our	explanations	of	how	managerial	“tools”	are	associated	with	
subsidiary performance and integration since they provide managers with relatively 
straightforward	suggestions	of	how	to	deploy	 these	“tools”	 (Foss	and	Pedersen	2002). 
Further,	 they	can	benefit	from	our	finding	that	 tight	 integration	into	the	MNC’s	global	
network	can	be	profitable	from	the	subsidiary’s	point	of	view.	Thus,	parent	firm	managers	
may	review	and	adjust	monitoring	devices	and	expenditure	used	in	headquarter–subsidi-
ary relationships since the subsidiaries’ self-interest in good performance should motivate 
them	to	attend	to	the	parent	firm’s	goals	(cf.	Aulakh	et	al.	1996; eisenhardt 1989; Osterloh 
and Frey 2000).	At	the	same	time,	parent	firm	managers	might	consider	instruments	to	
counter	rent-seeking	behavior	of	subsidiary	managers	 that	may	thwart	 this	motivation,	
e.g. by establishing inter-subsidiary teams to build emotional loyalty (Mudambi and Nav-
arra 2004).
Our	study	also	opens	up	some	paths	for	future	research.	First,	a	more	intensive	examina-
tion	of	strategic	vs.	operational	autonomy	seems	desirable.	Further,	future	research	could	
also	extend	our	study	by	studying	the	extent	to	which	the	positive	association	between	
integration and subsidiary performance can be traced to internal rent appropriation as 
opposed	to	external	market	position.	Separating	these	influences	conceptually	and	empir-
ically	would	provide	an	excellent	robustness	test	for	our	argument	that	the	parent	firm	and	
its subsidiaries should have a common interest in achieving successful global integration. 
It	would	be	particularly	instructive	to	examine	the	relationship	between	global	integration	
and	strong	subsidiary	performance	after	controlling	for	internal	rent-seeking.
We	 focused	on	 a	 carefully	 selected	 subset	 of	managerial	 “tools”	 by	which	 the	 for-
mal	organizational	structure	can	be	manipulated.	Future	research	could	complement	our	
approach	by	studying	“tools”	that	can	manipulate	the	informal	organizational	structure	and	
the	interactions	(if	any)	between	these	two	types	of	“tools”.	Further,	since	our	cross-sec-
tional	empirical	approach	only	allows	us	to	infer	association,	not	causality,	more	proces-
sual approaches that focus on the micro-processes of integration over time seem desirable. 
Further,	 knowledge	flows	and	performance	may	be	 self-reinforcing	mechanisms	 since	
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consistent	 above-average	 performance	may	 provide	 a	 subsidiary	with	 slack	 resources	
that	can	further	facilitate	knowledge	transfers	(Monteiro	et	al.	2008,	p.	103).	Thus,	future	
research	could	use	endogeneity	or	simultaneous-equation	models	to	study	such	recursive	
paths.	Finally,	we	collected	shared-level	constructs	from	individual	respondents	to	opera-
tionalize	our	constructs.	While	the	techniques	we	used	to	assert	the	reliability	and	validity	
of	our	measures	suggested	the	absence	of	significant	subjective	bias,	future	research	may	
complement	our	work	with	archival	measures	to	triangulate	data	sources.
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Endnotes
1	 Nobel	and	Birkinshaw	(1998,	p.	495)	found	that	their	centralization	scale	resulted	in	two	differ-
ent	factors	which	they	termed	“strategic	issue	centralization”	and	“operational	issue	centraliza-
tion”,	respectively.
2	 The	results	of	these	calculations	are	not	reported	here	due	to	limitation	of	space,	they	are	avail-
able from the corresponding author.
3	 That	 is,	 the	 scale	 is	 calculated	without	 the	 specific	 item	 in	 question	 to	 avoid	 inflating	 the	
correlation.
4	 We	used	oblique	rotation	because	we	expected	the	emerging	factors	to	be	theoretically	related	
(hair et al. 1998).
5	 Both	 the	 Bartlett	 test	 of	 sphericity	 (χ2 = 2935.726	with	 253	 d.f.,	 p = 0.000)	 and	 the	Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin	measure	of	sampling	adequacy	(MSA	=	0.8016,	“meritorious”)	indicated	the	data	
matrix	was	eligible	for	factor	analysis.	A	factor	was	retained	prior	to	rotation	if	its	eigenvalue	
was greater than unity (Kaiser-Guttman criterion).
6	 The	 results	 of	 the	 robust	OLS	 analyses	 are	 available	 from	 the	 corresponding	 author	 upon	
request.
7	 While	model	fit	is	still	acceptable	when	country	dummies	are	included	as	well,	we	prefer	to	
omit	them	since	their	inclusion	does	not	significantly	change	the	pattern	in	which	the	SEM	
supports our hypotheses.
8	 We	are	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pointing	our	attention	to	this	issue.
Appendix: Questionnaire Items
The	following	list	gives	an	overview	over	the	items	that	were	synthesized	into	the	respec-
tive factor according to the results of the reported factor analysis. all items were meas-
ured	on	Likert	scales	ranging	from	1	to	7.
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subsidiary Performance (cronbach’s alpha =	0.8990)
Regarding	the	following	criteria,	how	does	your	subsidiary	perform	compared	to	your	
parent	company?	“1”	means	“we	perform	much	worse	 than	 the	parent	company”,	“4”	
means	“our	performance	is	equal	to	the	parent	firm”,	and	“7”	means	“we	perform	much	
better	than	the	parent	firm”.
0	 	PERFROI:	Return	on	Investment
0	 	PERFPROFIT:	Profit
0	 	PERFCF:	Cash	Flow
inter-subsidiary Knowledge asset transfer (alpha =	0.9378)
“1”	means	“not	at	all”,	“7”	“to	a	great	extent”.
0	 	KAT1:	Our	 subsidiary	 has	 developed	 product	 technology	 that	was	 also	 applied	 in	
other subsidiaries.
0	 	KAT2:	Our	 subsidiary	 has	 developed	 process	 technology	 that	was	 also	 applied	 in	
other subsidiaries.
0	 	KAT3:	Our	subsidiary	has	developed	information	and	know-how	that	was	also	applied	
in other subsidiaries.
0	 	KAT4:	Technology	developed	by	our	subsidiary	helped	to	save	R&D	expenditure	in	
other subsidiaries.
0	 	KAT5:	Our	subsidiary	created	competencies	that	were	useful	in	other	subsidiaries.
0	 	KAT6:	 By	 transferring	 technology	 developed	 by	 our	 subsidiary,	 we	 have	 created	
value in other subsidiaries.
strategic autonomy (alpha =	0.6892)
Who	 makes	 the	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 following	 points?	 “1”	 means	 “parent	 alone	
decides”	and	“7”	means	“subsidiary	alone	decides”.
0	 	STAUT1:	Overall	direction	of	the	subsidiary’s	activities
0	 	STAUT2:	Which	new	projects	to	pursue
0	 	STAUT3:	Product	design
Operational autonomy (alpha =	0.6862)
Who	 makes	 the	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 following	 points?	 “1”	 means	 “parent	 alone	
decides”	and	“7”	means	“subsidiary	alone	decides”.
0	 	OPAUT1:	Hiring	and	firing	senior	staff
0	 	OPAUT2:	Training	programs	for	subsidiary	staff
0	 	OPAUT3:	Salary	level	of	subsidiary	employees
0	 	OPAUT4:	Transfer	of	subsidiary	staff	between	units
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tacitness of Knowledge (alpha =	0.8312)
“1”	means	“strongly	disagree”,	“7”	“strongly	agree”.
0	 	TAC1:	The	way	our	technology	works	can	easily	be	described	in	manuals.
0	 	TAC2:	 New	 staff	 can	 easily	 learn	 about	 our	 activities	 by	 talking	 to	 skilled	
employees.
0	 	TAC3:	Training	new	personnel	is	typically	a	quick	and	easy	job	for	us.
0	 	TAC4:	New	personnel	with	a	university	degree	can	learn	fast	about	our	technology.
Observability of Knowledge (alpha =	0.7768)
“1”	means	“strongly	disagree”,	“7”	“strongly	agree”.
0	 	OBS1:	Competitors	could	learn	about	our	technology	by	observing	our	employees.
0	 	OBS2:	 Competitors	 could	 learn	 about	 our	 technology	 by	 taking	 a	 tour	 of	 our	
facilities.
0	 	OBS3:	Competitors	could	learn	how	to	manufacture	our	products	by	examining	our	
machines	and	equipment.
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